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To Protect and To Serve: Effects of the 
Relationship Between the Brown Berets and 
Law Enforcement 
 





Abstract: During the late 1960s and into the early 1970s the 
Brown Berets were heavily involved in the Chicano Movement.  
They formed as a group of students with the goal of reforming the 
inequalities Hispanic people faced within the Los Angeles school 
system, though the greater circumstances quickly led the Brown 
Berets into the direction of being a militant organization with their 
focus shifting to police brutality and the Vietnam War.  As a result 
of this shift they became an enemy of the local police and later the 
federal government.  Thus, the Berets adopted the motto, “To 
Serve, Observe, and Protect,” which they consciously chose as it 
was extremely similar to the motto of the LAPD (To Protect and To 
Serve).  Using this motto indicated that the Berets believed they 
were, or should have been, the police of the community.  Both the 
Berets and the Los Angeles police department engaged in what can 
be called a war of words, in order to discredit one another. 
Protests, marches, and violence would result from this widening 
rift between the young militant Chicanos and the local police.  The 
research gathered and presented in this paper allows one to 
dissect the effects of this hateful relationship and conclude that 
police harassment, brutality, and infiltration ultimately contributed 
to the collapse of the Berets, but not before it helped propel the 
overall Chicano movement.  This study not only highlights the 
negative relationship between the Brown Berets of East Los 
Angeles, and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), but also 
the tensions between the Berets and the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department, as well as with the federal government, as 
the movement gained momentum.  These relationships will all be 
examined within the context of police and legal harassment, 
brutality, and infiltration tactics put into practice by these 
institutions against the Chicanos. 
 






The late 1960s and early 1970s in American history produced 
many social changes, which proved intense.  These years 
witnessed hundreds of riots, increased United States involvement 
in Vietnam and a changing of political parties in the White House.  
These years also witnessed the emergence of a Chicano activist 
organization known as the Brown Berets.  The Brown Berets 
emerged as a militant group, and were part of the Chicano 
Movement in East Los Angeles.  During this time, the barrio of 
East Los Angeles was predominantly populated by Anglos with 
Spanish surnames, and was the most populous Mexican enclave 
outside of Mexico City.  The Brown Berets emergence in the 
Chicano movement, as well as their demise a few years later, can 
both be traced to a variety of sociopolitical interactions between 
the Chicano minority and the dominant White culture of Los 
Angeles.  Of all these interactions, it appears that the most 
influential, in the formation and dissolution of the Brown Berets, 




Since the Chicano Movement of the late 1960s and early 70s, 
many scholars have discussed the rapid rise and decline of the 
movement.  The scholarship produced since that time, has come 
from individuals with a variety of backgrounds, ranging from those 
who were first hand participants in the events, to those who had no 
direct involvement in the movement whatsoever.  Of these 
scholars, few have specifically discussed the National Brown Beret 
Organization of East Los Angeles.  The few scholars who have 
covered the Brown Berets either mention them briefly in larger 
works or include them as part of the larger movement.  Limited as 
the resources may be on this subject, the work of these scholars has 
played an important role in helping us better understand the 
Chicano Movement and the National Brown Beret Organization.   
Armando Morales, was one of the first scholars to publish 
on the subject in 1972. During this time the Brown Berets were 
still in existence, as the movement had not yet died down. After, 






much attention.1  It was not until Carlos Munoz’ Youth, Identity, 
Power: The Chicano Movement, was published in 1989, that a 
steady influx of scholarship begin to be produced.2 It appears that 
every couple of years following the release Munoz’ book, 
scholarship continued to be published through journal articles and 
books up until the early 2000s.  Some of the major scholars who 
have published on the Chicano Movement are Carlos Munoz, 
Marguerite Marin, Ian-Haney Lopez, Ernesto Chavez, Ernesto 
Vigil, Francisco Rosales, Edward Escobar, and Mario Garcia. 
Munoz and Vigil were in fact heavily involved in the Chicano 
Movement.  
The scope of this study is to cover the National Brown 
Beret Organization and how they fed off the police harassment and 
brutality they experienced.  It concludes by discussing the role law 
enforcement’s continued harassment and involvement had in the 
dissolution of the Brown Berets.  In order to illustrate this, many 
articles and books were relied on to structure this argument with 
the use of primary sources to legitimize the argument.   
Carlos Munoz, a pioneer of the Chicano Student Movement 
and Professor at the University of California Berkeley, brings not 
only his scholarship, but his knowledge from first hand 
experiences to his book, Youth, Identity, Power: The Chicano 
Movement.  Munoz illustrates how the identity of the youth began 
to change from the “Mexican-American” generation to the Chicano 
identity.  In doing so Munoz covers key topics, which provide 
basic knowledge of the movement and its roots.  He also touches 
on the Brown Berets and their role within the movement allowing 
the reader to see how they blended into the movement.  Munoz 
does touch on the issues facing the Brown Berets and the Chicano 
community as a whole while offering insight and analysis into their 
rise and fall.  However, he does not specifically offer that same 
detailed insight or analysis for the Brown Berets as this study.  
Other Scholars such as Marguerite Marin have been able to 
offer more insight on the Brown Berets.  In her book titled, Social 
Protest in an Urban Barrio: A Study of the Chicano Movement, 
1966-1974, Marin asserts that the conflict between law 
                                                
1 Armando Morales, Ando Sangrando (I am Bleeding): a Study of Mexican 
American-police Conflict (Perspectiva Publications, 1972). 
2 Carlos Munoz, Youth, Identity, Power: The Chicano Movement  
(New York: Verso, 1989). 
	  
 




enforcement and the Brown Berets influenced the Beret’s 
behavior, ideology and how the group structured itself.3  Although 
this holds true, and is acknowledged in the following discussion, 
this article goes in a different direction to analyze how the conflict 
also played a major role in the Brown Beret’s quick rise to 
prominence and popularity within the community; while also 
asserting that these conflicts made them visible and gave 
creditability to their cause.  From here they were able to recruit, 
protest, and grow into a national organization.  Marin’s perspective 
looks at how the Brown Berets structured themselves because of 
these conflicts.  She points out how the Brown Beret’s did not trust 
other groups and how that influenced their rigid structure and how 
it led to their eventual infiltration.  
Marin also offers interpretation on the dissolution of the 
Brown Berets.  She touches on the subject of how they were easily 
infiltrated due to their rigid chain of command and suspicious 
behavior; however, she does not concentrate on the infiltrators 
direct actions.  This article aims to focus on these actions and how 
they directly affected the Brown Berets.  
Ernesto Chavez attributed the formation of the Brown 
Berets to the poor educational system in East Los Angeles at the 
time.  He makes this claim in Mi Raza Primero! Nationalism, 
Identity, and Insurgency in the Chicano Movement in Los Angeles, 
1966-1978.4  In his chapter titled, “Birth of a New Symbol” 
Chavez explains how the Brown Berets began and disbanded.  
Chavez describes events such as police brutality and protest in his 
discussion, but does not offer them as reasons for the Beret’s rise 
to prominence; rather, he suggesting these struggles had the effect 
of changing the movement from civic-minded individuals to a 
more radicalized group.  He goes on to describe police infiltration 
and harassment of the Berets, but asserts instead, that the groups 
dissolution was a result of David Sanchez exceeding his authority 
and creating quarrels within the organization.  
Ian Haney-Lopez is another scholar who focuses less on the 
Brown Berets and places more attention on the formation of the 
identity of Chicanos in East Los Angeles. Haney-Lopez places his 
                                                
3 Marguerite V. Marin, Social Protest in an Urban Barrio: a Study of the 
Chicano Movement, 1966-1974 (University Press of America, 1991). 
4 Erensto Chaves, Mi Raza Primero! Nationalism, Identity, and Insurgency in 
the Chicano Movement in Los Angeles, 1966-1978 (Berkeley, University of 






main argument around two important trials: the East L.A. 13, and 
the Biltmore 6.  These are two significant judicial cases that can 
help the reader better understand the various effects these trials had 
on the Chicano Movement and the Brown Berets themselves.  
Haney-Lopez uses these trials to show the formation of an identity.  
This article uses these trials not only to show how an identity was 
being formed, but also how the trials initially gave momentum to 
the Chicano movement and Brown Berets, while having the 
opposite effect in the years that followed and in fact played a part 
in their disbanding.  
Another important work is Ernesto B. Vigil’s The Crusade 
for Justice Chicano Militancy and the Government’s War on 
Dissent.5  Vigil is another individual who was actively involved in 
the Chicano Movement.  He places his attention on Corky 
Gonzales and the Crusade for Justice out of Denver.  However, 
Vigil does offer insight into law enforcements infiltration tactics 
and surveillance of the Brown Berets in East Los Angeles as well. 
Although Vigil does not offer interpretation on how these acts may 
have contributed to the Brown Berets growth or dissolution, the 
reader learns about the different law enforcement agencies and 
special units within these agencies that either monitored or 
infiltrated the Brown Berets.  Through his work we learn of 
different incidents and accounts that allow us to use primary 
sources to interpret them.  
  The scholars listed in this historiography have all made 
important contributions to the scholarship on the Chicano 
Movement and the Brown Berets.  Some have offered facts and 
details, while others have given in-depth analysis on certain areas 
of the movement.  Each of their contributions is unique, and 
equally important to the overall purposes of this research; such as, 
Haney-Lopez’ analysis of the legal system during the movement, 
and how it helped form an identity, or Vigil’s informative facts 
regarding police infiltration of the Brown Berets.  These author’s 
writings are necessary for building a structure in which the true life 
of the research can live, the primary sources that provide the 
backbone to the argument.  The remainder of this paper will use 
these two essential elements of research to concentrate exclusively 
on the Brown Beret’s encounters with local, state, and federal law 
                                                
5 Ernesto B. Vigil, The Crusade for Justice Chicano Militancy and the 
Government’s War on Dissent (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999). 
 




enforcement, and the lasting effects these relationships had on the 
organization.   
 
The Relationship Between The Brown Berets and 
Law Enforcement 
 
Four components of the relationship between the Brown Berets 
and law enforcement will now be explored to understand how the 
Berets were ultimately affected.  The first area explored is the 
police brutality to which Chicano residents of East Los Angeles 
were subjected.  Police brutality occurs when police officers use 
excessive amounts of force in dealing with an individual or 
suspect.  Cases of police brutality in East Los Angeles during this 
time had a distinct characteristic.  Often the individuals were not 
guilty of any major crime.  In some instances, minor traffic 
violations were used as provocation to pullover and harass 
Chicanos.  However, it was often the Chicanos who faced charges 
for assault on a peace officer, or for resisting arrest, after the 
encounter.  Charges for assaulting a peace officer, or resisting 
arrest, became common during this time.  The increase in these 
charges was partly due to the type of instruction given to officers 
while being trained at the academy.  One former sheriff’s deputy 
stated, “in the sheriff’s academy, officers are told that if you ever 
hit a suspect, or have to strike a person, that person shall be 
arrested for assaulting a police officer.”6 
The Jesus Dominguez case is a prime example of this 
brutality.  Dominguez let his teenage daughter and son attend a 
wedding dance with the expectations that his son would call him to 
pick them up when it was over.  Before the dance concluded, it 
was broken up by the police and Dominguez’ son, Mario, called 
his father notifying him of the circumstances.  The elder 
Dominguez woke his wife and younger son and headed down to 
the dance with their neighbor to pick up their children.  When 
Dominguez could not find his children, he asked a police officer as 
to their whereabouts.  According to Dominguez the officer 
responded by saying, “We’re not talking to anymore of you dumb 
Mexicans. Get out of here or we’ll run you in.”7  As a concerned 
parent, Dominguez asked a second time.  Apparently, the officer 
                                                
6 Ian Haney-Lopez, Racism On Trial The Chicano Fight For Justice 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 142.  






felt this was out of line and responded by beating Dominguez.  
After a severe beating that rendered him unrecognizable due to 
swelling and bruises on his face, he was then arrested for assault 
on a police officer.  Unfortunately, Dominguez’ troubles did not 
end that evening.  He was released from police custody on 
Wednesday, but two days later slipped into a coma because of his 
head injuries.8  In due course, Dominguez stood trial for assault on 
a police officer, which resulted in a hung jury.  However, District 
Attorney Evelle Younger decided to try Dominguez a second time, 
and again the result was a hung jury.  Not only did the brutal 
beating take a physical toll on Dominguez’ body, but it also took a 
financial toll because of attorney fees and the time the trials took 
away from his ability to make a living.   
Cases such as Jesus Dominguez’ were the ones the Brown 
Berets were shedding light on and protesting.  Subsequently, they 
became an enemy and target of local law enforcement agencies and 
later the federal government.  It was not until November 24, 1967 
that they chose to protest police brutality for the first time.  The 
first protest was in response to the treatment of the Santoya family 
after a simple call of disturbing the peace.9 The Brown Berets 
would hold three protests at the local courthouse and the East Los 
Angeles Sheriff’s Station between November 24, 1967 and the 
following January.  These protests were held to show law 
enforcement, and other authorities that Chicanos were tired of the 
unfair treatment they were receiving, as well as to bring a greater 
awareness to the Chicano community regarding these issue. 
During this two and half month span Chicano underground 
newspapers, such as La Raza also attempted to make the Chicanos 
aware of the police brutality and increased harassment facing their 
community.  These paper’s reports were also able to document the 
increased harassment the Chicano community experienced as they 
began to push back.  One article noted that many felt the undue 
harassment was in direct response to the protest.10  This type of 
harassment consisted of sheriff deputies routinely shining their 
floodlights into a local Chicano hangout known as the “La 
Piranya” coffeehouse.  Deputies used this tactic as a form of 
                                                
8 Celia Rodriguez, “The Torture of Dominguez,” Los Angeles Times. 
9 La Raza, December 25, 1967. Pg. 7. East Los Angeles, CA: County of Los 
Angeles Public Library Microfilms. 
10 “Sheriffs Harrass Brown Berets,” La Raza Year Book, 1968. Pg. 29. La Raza 
Newspaper Collection. UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center. 
 




intimidation as well as to make their presence known.  Deputies 
would also harass anyone who frequented the coffeehouse, which 
was run by David Sanchez of the Brown Berets.  The most 
common way the harassment took place was to arbitrarily stop 
these individuals.  During these encounters young Chicanos were 
subjected to questioning and illegal vehicle searches.  The Sheriff’s 
Department went so far as raiding La Piranya illegally and 
arresting individuals inside for curfew violations.11 
Along with the physical harassment came arrest and 
subsequently legal harassment as well, which is the second 
component of the relationship between the Brown Berets and law 
enforcement that will be examined.  Many Brown Berets and 
leading Chicano activists fell victim to felony charges for 
conspiracy and assault on a police officer along with many lesser 
charges.  The two cases that highlight this legal harassment best 
are the “East L.A. 13” case and the “Biltmore 6” case.  Both of 
these cases indicted not only Brown Berets, but other Chicano 
activists such as Moctesuma Esparza, Sal Castro, Eleazar Risco, 
and Carlos Munoz to name a few.  
Carlos Munoz described the arrest and indictment of the 
East L.A. 13 in a letter to the editor of La Raza,  
 
The Arrest can only be described as a terror tactic 
by our honorable law enforcement 
representative…the actions by the district attorney 
can only be described as an act of fascism, political 
intimidation and harassment of innocent citizens 
whose only crime is being concerned about the 
plight of our people…12  
 
The East L.A. 13 were charged with a general disturbing of the 
peace, as well as a separate charge for disturbing the peace of the 
schools, both of these charges were upgraded from misdemeanors 
to felonies by the additional stamp of conspiracy to commit the 
crimes.  Because of the conspiracy charges, each defendant faced 
                                                
11 “Sheriffs Harrass Brown Berets,” La Raza, March 1, 1968. Pg. 12. La Raza 
Newspaper Collection. UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center. 
12 Carlos Munoz, Letters to The Editor, Chicano Student News, June 12, 1968. 







over 60 years in prison.13  On top of these charges the defendants 
were facing a bail that did not fit the crime.  According to Sal 
Castro the bail was $12,500, which for the time was extremely 
high and more than twice the amount for assault with a deadly 
weapon and ten times more than burglary.14  In the minds of many 
Chicanos, the punishment and treatment the thirteen faced did not 
fit the alleged crime. 
The Biltmore 6 case was similar to the East L.A. 13 in the 
legal harassment aspect.   Again, numerous Chicano activists were 
being charged with the crimes they allegedly committed, as well as 
conspiracy to commit these crimes.  Although the jury did not hand 
down any convictions, the case proved more difficult to defend 
than the East L.A. 13 for the acclaimed Chicano lawyer Oscar 
Acosta.  The initial trial lasted over two years, and the last member 
of the six did not stand trial until seven years later when he came 
out of hiding and surrendered.  
Legal harassment kept Chicanos on trial and in the media, 
which law enforcement used to their advantage.  They participated 
in what is characterized as the war of words, which is the third 
component of the relationship between the Brown Berets and law 
enforcement this paper will examine.  Both entities were 
attempting to gain support for themselves while discrediting the 
other at the same time.  While the Berets and police officers 
implemented different methods in this “war”, each side played an 
equal role in the slander.  
The Brown Berets chose to spread their message mostly 
through the underground newspapers in the Chicano community as 
well as through word of mouth.  According to the Brown Beret 
Prime Minister David Sanchez, “the job of every Brown Beret is to 
preach new words.  You cannot have a community that is aware, 
until you have people preaching awareness, thereby creating an 
aware society.”15  Over time, the Brown Beret’s message became 
increasingly inflammatory and they even began to print articles 
advising Chicanos of their right to self-defense and the right to 
                                                
13 Mario T. Garcia, and Sal Castro. Blowout! Sal Castro & The Chicano 
Struggle for Educational Justice (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2011), 205. 
14 Ibid., 203. 
15 David Sanchez, “Birth of a New Symbol,” Material For The Brown Beret, p. 
6. Brown Beret Information Packet Compiled by Luis Angel Alejo, CSC U.C. 
Berkeley, December 1995. UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center.  
 




shoot in self-defense.  One article ends by saying, “Remember – 
Shoot to Kill.”16 
Los Angeles law enforcement’s message was not as 
inflammatory as the Brown Berets, but it was still effective.  They 
red baited them and labeled them as outside agitators, using the 
media and press conferences to do this. In an article for the Los 
Angeles Times, Mayor Sam Yorty not only pointed out that 
communists had attended a previous rally, but that older Chicano 
militants would stir up trouble and leave the younger activist to 
bear the brunt of the confrontation with police.17  Another notable 
attempt to discredit the Brown Berets came from Officer Thoms of 
LAPD’s intelligence department.  He reported to the U.S. Senate 
subcommittee investigating subversive and violent organizations.  
In this report he labeled the Brown Berets as an organization 
considered violent or subversive in nature.18   
The idea or thought that the Brown Berets were a violent 
and/or subversive organization gave law enforcement reason to 
infiltrate the organization, which is the fourth component of the 
relationship between these two groups.  The Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD), the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) 
division of the Department of the Treasury, all eventually 
infiltrated the Brown Berets, which would eventually allow these 
agencies to create divisions among the Chicano group’s leaders 
from the inside out.  Further, the Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(FBI) monitored the Berets closely as well.  
Among the infiltrators were Robert Avila and Fernando 
Sumaya of the LAPD, and Robert Acosta of the Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department.  These local agencies had 
specialized task forces developed to combat organizations 
considered violent and subversive.  They included the Criminal 
Conspiracy Section (CCS), Special Operations Conspiracy Squad 
                                                
16 La Causa, pg. 6. March 1971. East Los Angeles, CA: County of Los Angeles 
Public Library Microfilms. 
17  “Keep Children Out of Rally, Yorty Urges,” Los Angeles Times, January 28, 
1971. Devra Weber Collection. Box 2. File 15. UCLA Chicano Studies 
Research Center. 
18  Ruben Salazar, “Police-Community Rift,” (April 3, 1970) in Border 
Correspondent Selected Writings, 1955-1970, ed. Mario T. Garcia (Los 






(SOC), and the Public Disorder Intelligence Division (PDID).19  
The ATF infiltrated the Brown Berets with a suspect they had 
charged in a drug case, Eustacio Martinez.  These individuals and 
departments did not just act as intelligence agents, but as agent 
provocateurs as well.  They created the situations that were used to 
discredit the Brown Berets and drive rifts between members. 
Robert Avila posed as a high school student while joining 
the Brown Berets in early 1968.  Avila was involved in the 1968 
school walkouts that took place at numerous East Los Angeles 
high schools.  Sal Castro remembers Avila as a provocateur.  He 
recalls Avila encouraging students to burn trashcans during the 
protests.20  A year after the walkouts the Brown Berets discovered 
Avila to be an infiltrator.  La Causa, the Brown Beret newspaper 
reported the discovery and called Avila a traitor, vendido, and 
dog.21 
The other infiltrator, Fernando Sumaya, was more involved 
as an agent provocateur and even admitted to participating in the 
bombing of a Safeway grocery store because it did not support the 
grape workers strike.22  Sumaya was not arrested for the Safeway 
bombing or the fires set in the Biltmore Hotel the day Governor 
Reagan gave a speech.  However, he did become the key witness in 
the case against the Biltmore 6.  Montes, the sixth defendant, fled 
and went into hiding for seven years before he returned to stand 
trial.  During the course of the trial it was brought to light that 
many of the fires set on the top floors could not have been started 
by anyone other than Sumaya because they were sealed off by law 
enforcement in preparation for Governor Reagan’s visit.23 
 
                                                
19 Ernesto B. Vigil, The Crusade for Justice Chicano Militancy and the 
Government’s War on Dissent (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1999), 150. 
20 Garcia and Castro, Blowout!, 178. 
21 “Wanted,” La Causa, May 23, 1969. East Los Angeles, CA: County of Los 
Angeles Public Library Microfilms. 
22 Ron Einstoss, “Police Agent at Trial Denies Urging Crimes,” Los Angeles 
Times, August 5, 1971. Devra Weber Collection. Box 2. UCLA Chicano Studies 
Research Center.  
23 Jennifer G. Correa, “Chicano Nationalism: The Brown Berets and Legal 
Social Control” (master’s thesis, Oklahoma State University, 2006), 72. 
 




To Protect and To Serve 
 
Whether witnessed or experienced, police brutality and harassment 
was common for Chicanos growing up in East Los Angeles during 
the 1960s and early 1970s.  However, as times changed and 
activists became more radical, so too did the Chicanos.  The new 
Mexican-American youth, who now went by Chicano, moved 
toward forming a new identity and away from the assimilation 
tactics of the previous Mexican-American generation.  Mexican-
Americans were not seen as a distinct group and were statistically 
categorized as Anglos with Spanish surnames.  However, society, 
and more importantly the police, did not treat Chicanos like 
Anglos.  As a result, they began to move away from the Anglo 
culture forming their own Chicano identity.  Ruben Salazar 
described this identity as, “a Mexican-American with a non-Anglo 
image of himself.”24  This new identity was firmly established 
when Oscar Acosta successfully defended the East L.A. 13.  He 
used expert witnesses such as Ralph Guzman to prove that 
Mexican-Americans were a distinct class with a different language, 
culture and values.25  The Brown Berets also embraced this new 
identification of Chicano culture and race, using these ideals to 
unite.  The group adopted the brown beret as a physical symbol of 
this newfound pride they had for their race and the color of their 
skin.26  
The Brown Berets united in a way that other activists did 
not.  The harassment and brutality forced them to become a 
protection group for the community.  They felt that the East Los 
Angeles community had to unite against its enemies.  According to 
the La Raza newspaper the enemy was an outside force known as 
law enforcement, which thrived on the poor.27  The Brown Beret’s 
                                                
24 Ruben Salazar, “Who is a Chicano? And What Is It the Chicanos Want,” 
(February 6, 1970) in Border Correspondent Selected Writings, 1955-1970, ed. 
Mario T. Garcia (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 235-237. 
25 Viva Los 13 Valientes,” La Raza, September 3, 1968. La Raza Newspaper 
Collection. UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center.  
26 “Why a Brown Beret?” La Raza, June 7, 1968. East Los Angeles, CA: County 
of Los Angeles Public Library Microfilms. 
27 “Our Community Must Unite Against its Enemies,” La Raza November 14, 






motto stated, “To Serve, Observe, and Protect”28 which was a play 
on the LAPD’s motto “To Protect and To Serve”.  In essence they 
saw themselves as the police of the police.  The Brown Beret’s 
motto also meant they would vocally and physically support the 
different causes of the movement, as well as monitor law 
enforcement agencies that dealt with Chicanos.  Lastly, the Brown 
Berets vowed to protect the rights of Mexican-Americans by "all 
means necessary."  
Protecting Chicano rights would take more than 
spontaneous action.  Organization would be needed and David 
Sanchez, the Brown Beret prime minister would facilitate this 
organization.  One of his early attempts to unite Chicanos was 
opening the La Piranya coffeehouse, which was more of a 
gathering place than a coffeehouse.  Sanchez was able to secure a 
grant with the help of Father John Luce of the Church of Epiphany, 
in Lincoln Heights, which he used to open La Piranya.  The 
coffeehouse proved to have a significant impact on the Brown 
Berets and the movement as it gave young Chicanos a place not 
only to socialize, but also organize. La Piranya also sponsored 
speakers such as Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Corky 
Gonzales and Reies Tijerina.29  These events along with the police 
harassment that continued to take place further politicized Chicano 
activists as well as the Brown Berets.  During their protest, they 
could be heard yelling “Chicano Power”, which came after Stokely 
Carmichael coined the term “black power.” 
Their motto would lead them to protest cases of police 
brutality and act as security at protests such as the “blowouts.”  
Sanchez recalls their roll in these protests: “We were at the 
walkouts to protect our young people.  When they started hitting 
with sticks, we went in, did our business, and got out.  What’s our 
business? We put ourselves between the police and the kids, and 
took the beating.”30  This single event gave them publicity and 
credibility.  And while their way of uniting would land them in 
legal trouble, it also proved effective in propelling the momentum 
                                                
28 David Sanchez, “Birth of a New Symbol,” Material For The Brown Beret, p. 
15. Brown Beret Information Packet Compiled by Luis Angel Alejo, CSC U.C. 
Berkeley, December 1995. UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center.  
29 Ian Haney-Lopez, Racism On Trial The Chicano Fight For Justice 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 180. 
30 Dial Torgerson, “Brown Power Unity Seen Behind School Disorders,” Los 
Angeles Times, March 17, 1968. Carlos Vasquez Collection. Box 2. File 4. 
UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center. 
 




of the movement as well as the overall unity among Chicanos as 
well.  
The legal harassment that the Brown Berets and other 
Chicanos faced gave the community something to protest, and 
once again they came together to help each other out.  On May 31, 
1968, two months after the school “blowouts” five Brown Berets 
were either arrested or indicted and became part of the East L.A. 
13.  The following day, hundreds of protestors gathered in front of 
the Los Angeles Police Department and even more gathered in 
front of the county jail the following day.31  Chicanos not only 
united in protest, but they also attempted to help by raising money 
to defend these individuals.  There were many advertisements run 
in the underground newspapers for dances and events that would 
benefit the defense of the East L.A. 13.32  
There was also support from others such as politicians and 
Black activist.  Both Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy’s 
campaign offered bail money before authorities reduced the bail 
amount.  Individuals in allied civil rights movements issued 
statements of support such as Stokley Carmichael.  “We of the 
SNCC give our full support to our brothers from the Brown Berets, 
we feel certain that the Berets are going in the right direction.  We 
know the charges are phony…therefore, we have to move together 
to destroy the man so our people can live.”33  This arrest aroused 
the excitement from the blowouts and gave the movement and the 
cause for educational reform more publicity.  
Although the harassment and brutality was initially able to 
help the Brown Berets emerge as a leading activist organization, it 
would ultimately be a cause in their dissolution.  The legal 
harassment and intimidation was far more hindering than police 
tactics such as shining floodlights into La Piranya.  Legal 
harassment did two things, it siphoned away resources and it 
intimidated current members as well as potential members, 
eventually wearing them out.  Legal harassment is evident in the 
two legal cases mentioned earlier.  Less than a year after the East 
                                                
31 Marguerite V. Marin, Social Protest In an Urban Barrio A Study of the 
Chicano Movement, 1966-1974 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
Inc., 1991), 101. 
32 Chicano Student News, Vol. 1 No. 5. Chicano Student News Newspaper 
Collection. UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center. 







L.A. 13 indictments, the Biltmore 6 were indicted but did not seem 
to get as much attention or support in the underground newspapers 
as the East L.A. 13 did.  There was no full page of pictures 
showing the demonstrations and reporting on them like the 
previous demonstrations.  There were no advertisements for dances 
to support the Biltmore 6.  This is evidence that either support was 
waning or resources had become far too scarce as Chicanos 
continued to donate to these legal defense funds.  
Along with waning resources and support, key members 
began to leave the organization as well.  Carlos Montes was the 
Brown Beret’s minister of information and associated with the 
organization since its inception, but he eventually fled and went 
into hiding as the harassment continued to grow.  With threats on 
his life from an LAPD officer and another high-profile political 
case pending, Montes felt it was best to flee.  While the constant 
harassment that led to Montes’ vacancy continued to cast its black 
cloud over the movement, the Brown Berets also contributed to the 
paranoia that came from his flight.  They unwisely publicized and 
blamed Montes’ disappearance as a possible kidnapping by the 
CIA.34  As an unintended result, they legitimized the danger of 
becoming part of the movement or the Brown Berets.  
Furthermore, dealing with court cases kept leaders such as Montes 
and Sanchez in and out of court rather than organizing and 
concentrating on the issues.  This disrupted not only their lives but 
the movement as well.  
The disruption that was spawned from legal harassment 
was partly made possible by local and federal law enforcement 
agencies infiltrating the Brown Berets.  The infiltrators acted as 
agent provocateurs.  According to Gary Marx, an agent 
provocateur is an agent who,  
 
…assertively seeks to influence the actions taken by 
the group… The agent may go along with illegal 
actions of the group, he may actually provoke such 
actions… This may be done to gain evidence for 
use in a trial, to encourage paranoia and internal 
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dissension, and/or to damage the public image of a 
group.35 
 
Fernando Sumaya was one of these individuals who disrupted the 
Brown Berets during his short stint as a member.  His actions 
directly led to the arrest of Brown Beret members and gave law 
enforcement the ability to discredit the Brown Berets while 
Sumaya was portrayed as the hero.  The Los Angeles Times wrote, 
“Policeman Fernando Sumaya, 23, a key witness before the county 
Grand Jury, was credited by arson investigators with protecting a 
devastating conflagration and the possible loss of hundreds of 
lives… the indictment charges that four of the ten, two of them 
officials in the Brown Berets, planned the fires.”36  These actions 
cover all parts of Marx’s actions of an agent provocateur whose 
objective according to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was, “to 
expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the new Left 
organizations, their leadership and adherents.”37 
Another key infiltrator that helped bring the Brown Berets 
to a halt was Eustacio Martinez.  Martinez worked for the Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms Division of the U.S. Treasury Department.  
Acting as an agent provocateur, he infiltrated the Mexican-
American Youth Organization (MAYO), the Brown Berets, and 
the National Chicano Moratorium Committee.  During this time, 
he was able to create dissension amongst Rosalio Munoz and 
David Sanchez, provoke violence and incidents that led to arrests 
and a raid of the Chicano Moratorium office.  While these 
incidents may not have been the sole cause for the Brown Berets 
dissolution, they did provide continued obstacles that proved too 
challenging for the organization to overcome.  
These cases are only a few examples of the obstacles that 
police infiltration and agent provocateurs were able to put before 
the Brown Berets.  There were other infiltrators such as Robert 
Acosta of the Sheriff’s Department, and Robert Avila of the 
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LAPD, and Sergio Robledo of the LAPD.38  Through research, it 
was uncovered that during a raid of the Chicano Moratorium 
office, provoked by Martinez, Sergio Robleto and two others were 
arrested.39  Further, it was discovered in an article for Rolling 
Stone magazine that Sergio Robledo of the LAPD retired in 1995 
after 26 years of service.40  That would put Robledo right out of the 
academy during the time the Chicano Movement and Brown 
Berets began to emerge.  This opens up the possibility that there 
were other infiltrators attempting to destroy the Brown Berets and 
deserves further research. 
Episodes caused or provoked by infiltrators also allowed 
law enforcement to effectively discredit the Brown Berets in their 
war of words.  Sanchez was even inclined to admit that after the 
Biltmore 6 indictments that the circumstances did look bad.41  
Further, the Brown Berets alienated the more conservative 
Mexican-Americans as their message became increasingly 
inflammatory towards the police.  Police Chief Ed Davis echoed 
this fact when he stated: “In the Mexican community the great bulk 
of people are very law abiding and very anti-Marxist and very 
supportive of the police and very respectful of the uniform.”42 
In conclusion, the relationship between the Brown Berets 
and law enforcement was a passionate struggle for the upper hand.  
Law enforcement attempted to maintain the status quo while the 
Brown Berets attempted to attain fair treatment and protection of 
their rights.  This attempt to obtain equal treatment under the law 
fueled the Brown Berets, as they became a leading Chicano activist 
organization.  However, law enforcement outlasted the Brown 
Berets determination, which proved to be detrimental to the 
organization over time.  The persistence of harassment, 
intimidation, and infiltration, from various law enforcement 
agencies, discouraged participation in groups considered 
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subversive to the law, such as the Brown Berets.  In addition, these 
patterns of harassment and eventual infiltration allowed them make 
arrests, which deflected the Brown Beret’s physical and monetary 
resources to legal battles.  With little progress made by the Berets 
and continued opposition from the Los Angeles government, 
infiltrators found it easy to create situations where individuals 
would become extreme, even to the point of bombing a grocery 
store, which proved to be counter-productive.  These infiltrators 
not only enticed members to do things they may not have 
otherwise done, but they also created dissension within the 
organization itself.  This allowed the authorities to portray the 
movement and Brown Berets in a negative light, thus discrediting 
their efforts.  While it may not be possible at this time to state the 
precise ramifications law enforcement tactics had in the disillusion 
of the Brown Berets; this study has attempted to show, that these 
actions can be seen as one of the major contributing factors in their 
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